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Notes to the Policy table

Executive Directors outside of the UK

In respect of salary, benefits and pension, in the event that an Executive Director is based outside of the UK, the REMCO reserves the right to determine the individual’s remuneration arrangements in line with their base or host country, within the spirit of the Policy.

Payments from previously agreed remuneration arrangements

The REMCO reserves the right to make any remuneration payments where the terms of the payment were agreed (i) before the Policy came into effect, or (ii) at a time when the relevant individual was not a Director of the Company and, in the opinion of the REMCO, the payment was not in consideration for the individual becoming a Director of the Company. The REMCO also reserves the right to honour pre-existing contractual obligations in accordance with the terms of the service contract and relevant incentive plan. Details of any such payments will be set out in the Annual Report on Remuneration as they arise.

Selection of performance measures

For the 2023 performance year, the annual bonus scorecard will consist of financial delivery (35%), operational excellence (35%), progress in the energy transition (15%), and safety (15%). Targets are derived from the annual business plan. These measures are designed to drive focus on the financial and operational performance critical to our success in delivering our Powering Progress strategy. The REMCO believes it is important for annual variable pay to remain balanced, with short-term operational components complementing the LTIP’s focus on longer-term financial and strategic outcomes. The same annual bonus scorecard applies to the majority of Group employees, supporting consistency of remuneration and alignment of objectives across employees and senior management.

For 2023 LTIP awards, performance will be assessed based on 75% financial metrics (relative CFFO divided by average capital employed, relative TSR, absolute OFCF, equally weighted) and 25% on a strategic measure focused on Shell’s journey in the energy transition. These metrics are designed to support our strategic ambition of accelerating our transition to be a net-zero emissions business while creating value for our shareholders.

For the relative measures, 200% vests for first position, 150% for second, 80% for third, and 0% for ranking fourth or fifth. The comparator group consists of four of the strongest companies in our industry (BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil and TotalEnergies). Outperforming Shell’s closest competitors on key financial metrics is challenging. A vesting outcome of 80% of target (40% of maximum) for median performance in a small comparator group is considered appropriate by the REMCO. The REMCO is aware that vesting for median performance is generally set at a limit of 25% of maximum for other UK companies. However, these are typically applied against a larger comparator group. Commentary on the REMCO’s consideration of the constituents of the comparator group is set out in the 2022 introduction from the REMCO Chair.

To simplify the plan and align with market practice, it is proposed that the underpin be removed from the plan effective from 2024 awards.


There are a number of specific areas in which the REMCO may exercise discretion, including:

  • To review the specific measures, weightings and targets for the annual bonus scorecard and LTIP award annually and adjust accordingly to evolve with Shell’s strategy and circumstances to ensure that the targets remain stretching but realistic. If the REMCO were to propose any material changes to the LTIP performance metrics, it would consult with major shareholders; and
  • To adjust mathematical variable pay outcomes if and to the extent that it considers this appropriate. This power to adjust the outcomes is broad and includes adjusting the outcomes to zero. For example, an adjustment might be made if the REMCO considers:
    • The mathematical outcomes do not reflect the wider financial or non-financial performance of the Company or the participant over the performance period;
    • The LTIP vesting percentage is not appropriate in the context of circumstances that were unexpected or unforeseen at award; and
    • There is any other reason why an adjustment is appropriate.

It is not anticipated that discretion would be used for upwards adjustment. If, in exceptional circumstances, it was considered, this would be done only after consultation with major shareholders.

Performance outcomes and/or share price movements make it difficult to predict the final amounts delivered under the LTIP at the time of award. Each year, the REMCO reviews the LTIP vesting values and single figure outcomes for the Executive Directors to ensure that they are appropriate. The REMCO will review the formulaic single figure outcomes relative to the quality of performance outcomes and adjust these, taking into account Shell’s performance, shareholder experience, the operation of the remuneration structures and any other relevant factors to ensure that the highest variable pay outcomes are only achieved in years with the highest quality performance. In years where the vesting outcome makes the total remuneration inappropriate for any Executive Director, the REMCO will consider an adjustment to the annual bonus outcome and/or the LTIP vesting outcome for the purposes of managing remuneration quantum. In making any adjustment to the annual bonus and/or LTIP vesting outcome for this purpose, REMCO will consider the overall level of remuneration for the Executive Director, the operation of the annual bonus, the operation of the LTIP, the wider performance of Shell over the performance periods, as well as the internal context for other employees. An explanation of any discretionary adjustment would be set out in the relevant year’s Directors’ Remuneration Report.

Malus and clawback

Variable pay awards may be made subject to adjustment events. At the discretion of the REMCO, such an award may be adjusted before delivery (malus) or reclaimed after delivery (clawback) if an adjustment event occurs.

Adjustment events will be specified in award documentation and it is intended that they will, for example, relate to restatement of financial statements due to material non-compliance with a financial reporting requirement; misconduct by an Executive Director or misconduct through their direction or non-direction; any material breach of health and safety or environment regulations; serious reputational damage to Shell; material failure of risk management; corporate failure; or other exceptional events as determined at the discretion of the REMCO. The REMCO retains the right to alter the list of adjustment events in respect of future awards.

Differences in Remuneration Policy for Executive Directors from that for other employees

The remuneration policies, structure, and approach to setting remuneration levels are consistent across organisational levels at Shell, with consideration given to location, seniority and responsibilities. A higher proportion of total remuneration is tied to variable pay for Executive Directors and members of Senior Management, to reflect these individuals’ positions of influence and accountability.

Detailed discussion of how executive remuneration aligns with wider Company pay policy may be found in the “Workforce engagement on remuneration matters” section of the Annual Report on Remuneration.

Long-term Incentive Plan
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Remuneration Committee
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